HUMAN FACTOR IN MARITIME SECURITY

The core value of maritime security, added to the IMO mission statement in the aftermath of 9/11, has raised some obvious issues. A benefit of the December 2002 Diplomatic Conference was to successfully highlight and promote the need for the development of security consciousness in the industry and amongst its customers. The ISPS Code has highlighted these requirements but it has also exposed that there needs to be a greater interface between the maritime industry and the security industry. Two recent articles in the Baltic Exchange magazine demonstrated that a forum needs to exist to develop the commonality of purpose in applying common sense and value for money in reducing as far as possible the terrorist threat to the maritime industry.

To comply with the IMO requirements and regulations, maritime authorities will have to strengthen their security systems. And one of the weakest links that remains, as in other industries, is the human factor.
Clearly it is not possible to impose a security culture but to create and grow one will not be possible within a matter of months. What is sought is a climate in which the benefits of good security theory and practice develop and are nurtured. It can be shown from other industries that will bring commercial benefits – a necessary return on any investment. Without imposing expensive equipment solutions on either ports or ships, much can be achieved by balancing the factors of comprehensive procedures, existing equipment and training.

In the first instance let us focus on procedures and people. Planning is not an end in itself but it does provide a disciplined framework within which to analyse any problem. Security consultants will usually advise of the need for a security plan. This is for the good reason that a plan will develop a process which will provoke necessary adequate consultation and discussion between the interested parties. This should be the start of a process which will be reviewed annually or whenever the threat increases or decreases. Any plan needs to be owned and given a degree of commitment, not just by the author, but to those who become involved in putting it into practice. Amongst the planning criteria there needs to be a measurement yardstick to evaluate the success of the plan.

A major concern within the plan will be the treatment of people. Permanent or temporary workers can be a source of consequential loss for the company. Contract workers since they will be unlikely to be fully trained or experienced, represent a higher degree of risk both to security and safety. For example in 1999 at Heathrow airport it was revealed that all contract employees from a cleaning firm were given passes which gave them random access throughout the airport. The consequences of such an “unprotected” system were only fully realized some two years later. Inevitably this shows the necessity to have in place an effective system of employee identification. Parallels can be drawn with ships and ports. Authorities need to be aware of the impact that one failure covering personnel and procedures can have.

“Effectively the focus on the provision of security measures has shifted from the relatively minor threat to trade and transport (from theft, hijackings, terrorist interventions, etc) to the much more alarming threat from trade and transport, where the mechanisms and processes of transport could be used as weapons”.

Besides the need to train permanent and temporary workers fully in the security regulations of the port or ship concerned there is a priority requirement for effective vetting of personnel. This is now a key component of any security training program. Given the risk potential, as part of the training program, appropriate vetting needs to be provided not only at a senior level but also for every employee. It is an unfortunate lesson from experience within the security environment that temporary workers are rarely aware of the detail of existing regulations, particularly those relating to security. For this reason it is essential to train workers before they start any employment. Whilst it may be cheap to employ temporary or part time workers, rather than permanent, in case of accidents the question arises who pays for the consequences if not the management. Just as important a part of the plan will be the issue of the training and vetting of drivers/contractors who have access to the port/ship.

A related people issue is the two way role of commercial disclosure. Any employee, whatever their level within the organization, can provide confidential information to any body outside amongst whom there will be those without the best interests at heart of that organization. Trust is essential in business relations but it is equally essential to remain vigilant. How does the maritime organization acquire its information on such terrorist threats? It needs to use information provided by its employees, who will notice acts and events that may form part of a jigsaw of information. Employees must have the will and confidence and be encouraged to report untoward events promptly.

To summarise some parallels from an incident elsewhere. A multinational consumer goods company employed temporary workers when the factory employees took annual vacation in August. The company were due to launch their most popular, profitable, brand in a different country in October. Immediately prior to the holiday period the stock was placed in their own conditioned warehouse. Custom and practice was such that it was the security staff, in addition to their normal duties, who monitored the temperature. In August the permanent staff from the company went on their planned vacation and temporary staff from an outsource agency were employed. Needless to say the temperatures were not monitored correctly. On arrival of the export stock in the foreign country it was noticed that it had both a peculiar taste and smell. As a result the stock had to be withdrawn, the production traced and the circumstances investigated. The momentum of the product launch was lost and it took over two months for the cause of the problem to be traced. As a result some millions of dollars of profit were lost.

In their examination of lessons to be learnt from the incident the company discovered that it had:

It learned that it had failed to recognize the importance of the security staff and lacked an overall crisis response plan.

To summarise the above: procedures and equipment play a fundamental role in the creation of effective security yet the key role of people has to be acknowledged. Besides one’s own employees visiting contractors and their representatives need to be subject to security. Temporary workers need to be involved in the security processes just as permanent workers are.

A security system needs to ensure that those required to play roles are subject to careful selection and scrutiny. Detailed training should be carried out such that all are able to carry out security responsibilities and are given regular briefings on the security requirement. The program should also incorporate regular evaluation to monitor both training and practice.

Given the potential terrorist threats, reinforced by Madrid 03/04, the maritime industry needs to ensure such security systems are in place. The encouragement of a dialogue with the security industry can only help.